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Article 4

COMMERCIAL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL WRONGS
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS*
I.

COMMERCE AND THE CONSTITUTION

I am sitting on a train writing a speech for a program sponsored
by the University of Maryland School of Law. I am in the dining car
of the Broadway Bomber, or some other Amtrak name like that, my
pens and notebook spread out on the table before me. About all I
have done is pick a title: Contract and Communion. This much I
can do without much difficulty because contract and something like
communion is pretty much what I always write about. Most of my
work is concerned with the division between the commercial and the
communitarian, the legal and the illegal, the righted and the outlawed, the legitimate and the illegitimate, the propertied and the
dispossessed. The framework from which I have been considering
this topic most recently is grounded in private law, in particular contract and property law. I am interested in concepts of ownership as
both legal relationship and mental construct.
In this Article, I plan to make an analogy between social and
private contract. I do so from a conviction that aspects of social
contract are characterized by strategies of evasion and control that
are embedded in the rhetoric and symbology of the private sector. I
use the model of private contract to illustrate the problematics of
social contract because it seems a manageable way to test my hypotheses. At issue is a structure of relation in which a cultural code
has been inscribed; if I am inside the bell jar of this common culture, my dilemma becomes how I can situate myself in order to evaluate it. Thus, I attempt to reduce the all-encompassing social
contract to a manageable, private contract context (or is it that I am
using the all-encompassing private contract to examine in microcosm what our social contract has become?).
Private contract is based on will theory, in which individual will
and private acts of interpretation are joined to fulfill the expectations of not the larger, but the smaller society of the parties to it.
For example, if one looks at documents like the Declaration of Inde* Associate Professor of Law and Women's Studies, University of Wisconsin at
Madison. B.A., Wellesley College, 1972; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1975. This Article
originally was presented as the Simon E. Sobeloff Lecture at the University of Maryland
School of Law in April 1989.
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pendence and the Constitution, one can see how they marry aspects
of consent and aspects of symbology-for example, the notion of
freedom. On the one hand, there is the letter of the law, exalted in
these documents, which describes a quite specific range of rights
and precepts. On the other hand, there is the spirit of the law, the
symbology of freedom, which is in some ways utterly meaningless
and empty-although at the same time this very emptiness provides
a vessel to be filled with a sense of possibility, with a plurality of
autonomous yearnings.
I pause for a moment and gaze out the window of the train. It is
lunchtime. The dining car is starting to fill up and an Amtrak attendant politely intrudes into the middle of my reveries. She brings
me a menu, some silverware, and another traveller with whom I am
to share my table. My new companion is a stockbroker from New
York. He says he travels a lot too, and we talk about feeling uprooted, even homeless.
Then we talk about being homeless.
"I never give money when people beg from me," he says. "I
tell them I have nothing. But I always stop to chat."
"Why?" I ask, meaning why does he not give money, but he
misunderstands my question and proceeds to explain why he always
stops to talk.
"Finding out a little bit about who they are," he explains,
"helps me remember that they're not just animals."
"Are you at risk of forgetting that?" I ask, wondering exactly
whom it helps when he stops to reassure himself of a humanity unconnected to any concerted recognition of hunger and need.
"Yes," he replies to my surprise. "Over time, my conversations
have helped me not to resent their presence on the streets and in my
neighborhood so much." He seems very anxious to prove the benignity of his neglect. It is an awkward, even dangerous moment in
our short acquaintance; we chew in silence for a while, each not
wanting to offend the other further. I ponder the notion of speech
as "propertizing", and the silly irony, given the circumstance, of
metaphors like eating one's words.
A little while later, we part, not much more said, but cordially
enough. I cannot help noticing that he does not tip our waitress at
all.
II.

CONTRACT AND COMMUNION

From a temporary office I have been given at a university in
Southern California while there for a conference, I continue to pon-
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der the equation of privacy with intimacy, and of publicity with dispossession. I think about the problem of homelessness as a
metaphor for, as well as the manifestation of, collective disownership. I take my wondering to class and place it before my students.
There are, I tell them, by conservative estimates, 70,000 homeless
people in New York City alone.' While a disproportionate number
are black, homelessness has no necessary connection to race. I,
however, do see it as interwoven with the legacy of slavery, in its
psychology of denial, in the notions of worth and unworthiness that
go into the laws that deal with the homeless, in the ranking of "legitimate" needy and "illegitimate" homeless-these are old, familiar,
cruel, blind games that make bastards and beggars of those who are
our family.
From my temporary office, I overlook a plaza called "The Marketplace." Pink-tiled and stuccoed, it seems too neat to be real. In
it are the university bookstore, a couple of restaurants and juice
bars, the accounting offices for the university, colorful boutiques
that advertise for salespeople who are "bright, creative and love to
smile," and a movie theater, now showing Pet Sematary,2 Friday the
Thirteenth, PartH,3 and Honey, I Shrunk the Kids!,4 which the university
uses as a lecture hall by day. It is, I think, a literal marketplace of
ideas. I sit and look and long for the messy complication of New
York, where I have a home that I almost never see anymore.
The next week, I am in yet another city at yet another institution. I am there to give a two-week session on homelessness and the
law.
There are many homeless people on my street in New York, I
tell my class full of non-New Yorkers. From the window of my
home, I watch the well-heeled walk by the homeless all day long.
Some give money; most do not. From time to time, something very
visible or controversial happens with reference to the homelessness
issue, and then the well-heeled give more or less, depending upon
which way sentiments are twisted. Former Mayor Edward Koch puts
up signs in the subway telling travellers not to give to panhandlersthat it is bad for tourism. Someone writes an editorial and says the
streets belong to the taxpayers, and that the homeless should pay
rent for their use. A homeless child dies in her mother's arms.
1. Lurie & Wodiczko, Homeless Vehicle Project, 47 OCTOBER 54, 54 (1988).
2. Paramount Pictures 1989.
3. Paramount Pictures 1981.
4. Touchstone Pictures 1989.
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While small disenfranchisements give birth to large disenfranchisements, sympathies come and go.
There was a particularly well-publicized story about a pregnant
homeless woman who gave birth to her child in the subway.5 The
state intervened and took the child away, saying that she was an unfit
mother based on her economic circumstance. The American Civil
Liberties Union represented the mother in her attempt to maintain
custody of her child. While there is some provision in New York to
protect a newborn child from her mother's destitute circumstance,
there is no law in the United States to provide that mother with the
housing, health care, or economic rights with which to provide for
her child.
While many European constitutions and the European
Convention on Human Rights guarantee everyone the
right to an education, the right to health care and even the
right to a job or welfare payments, our Constitution does
not.
Our Bill of Rights guarantees the individual's right to
be free of Governmental intrusions, not the individual's entitlements to Government support. The Supreme Court
has uniformly rejected all claims to constitutional
entitlements .... 6
My students always fight with me about this point. They tell me
that this is the land of opportunity and that anyone who works hard
can get anything they want. (My students are all very hard workers.)
But I am not arguing, I say to them, that there are not laws that
provide her with the opportunity to seek out ajob and to be successful at it. But if she does not find ajob, or if she is not successful at it,
then she will have very little recourse, for the government has little
or no obligation to provide for her. For example, friends working in
the Department of Social Welfare in New York have told me that
food stamps, for those who are lucky enough to get them, who most
frequently do not include the homeless, provided, as of 1988, only
forty-eight cents a meal.
In effect, I tell my angry students, the homeless have no real
right to conjugal benefits, to family of their own, to anything like
happiness, or to the good health that is necessary to enjoy life, appreciate liberty, and pursue happiness. Furthermore, I tell them, our
5. See A Homeless Woman Gives Birth in Subway, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1989, at B6, col.

6.
6. Cutler, Pro-Life? Then Pay Up, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1989, at A29, cols. 3-4.
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national and collective failure to provide guaranteed rights to food,
shelter, and medical care has significant costs that they will have to
deal with in their lifetimes: both as a constitutional or a public matter, and in the overwhelming power of specialized economic interests, i.e., the power of so-called private interests.
It is the last few minutes of class; the students are hungry and
edgy. They growl with the restless urge to go shopping. I, who also
love to shop, nevertheless run on and on. I am terribly concerned, I
say, about the way in which hunger, lack of education, and homelessness are devastating our communities, and most particularly women, children and blacks. I am alarmed by the rationalization, even
the denial, of this cruel withholding of the right to survival itself, in
terms of untextualized constitutionalisms, governmental restraint,
states' rights, to say nothing of indigency being characterized as just
a matter of "choice."
I give examples of the deep-rooted commonplaceness of our
economically patterned notions of humanity. I tell stories of life in
the subways of New York. Once, while getting off the F train at 14th
Street, I saw an old beggar woman huddled against a pillar. Behind
me, a pretty little girl of about six exclaimed: "Oh, daddy, there's
someone who needs our help." The little girl then was led off by the
hand, by her three-piece-suited father, who patiently explained that
just giving money to her directly was "not the way we do things."
Then he launched into a lecture on the United Way as succor for the
huddled masses. It was a first lesson in distributive justice, conditioned passivity, indirection, and distance-statistical need positioned against actual need. I walked behind them for a little way,
listening to him teach: responsiveness to immediate need actually
was devalued as wrong.
A few moments later, just a little further along the concourse
and still in the 14th Street subway, I saw another homeless person;
he lying on a bench. He lay extended along its length, one leg
dropped on the ground, the other stretched out on the bench; one
arm flung across his chest, the other crooked under his head. He
was dressed poorly, but not as badly as some street people. He had
a little beard and a complacent face. His mouth hung open, and his
eyes half closed, yet open. His eyes were a startlingly vacant blue,
heavy-lidded yet staring at the subway station ceiling, intense, yet
with no particular focus. These were the eyes, I thought, of a dead
man. Then, I rationalized, no, he could not be. He is just sleeping
like my mother used to, with the whites of her eyes showing, when
she was sitting in her chair and did not really want to fall asleep.
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Then I looked at the face of another man who had seen what I
saw, both of us still walking past, yet never stopping for a second. I
tried to flash worry at him. He, however, was seeking reassurance,
which he took from my face despite myself. I could see him rationalize his concern away in the flicker of an eye. We walked behind each
other up the stairs, and three blocks down Broadway before I lost
him and the conspiracy of our solidarity. Thus, the man on the subway bench died twice: in body and in the spirit I murdered.
(Deep inside, I am made insecure by the wandering gazes of my
students. I wonder, as they obviously do, is all this really related to
law?) I think that all of this is related, I say aloud, to our ability to
interpret our laws. What we had engaged in was not merely a rationalization, but the imposition of an order. The ironclad imposition of a world view requiring adherence to fictional visions cloaked
in the comfort of familiar truth-denying truisms: "I know a black
family and they're making it;" "My grandfather came to this country
with nothing and ... ;" "He'll just use it for booze or drugs"-even
though "he" looks hungry and asks for money for food. We, the
passersby of the dispossessed, were a society of sorts. We made, by
our actions, a firm social compact by which we were made comfortable and whose bounds we did not transgress. We also made a bargain of the man who lay dead. We looked at each other for
confirmation that he was not dead; we, the grim living, determined
to make profit of the dead.
After class, my students rush to the dean to complain. They are
not learning real law, they say, and they want someone else to give
them remedial classes. How will they ever pass the bar with subway
stories? I am called in by the dean, who even in his distress, does
not forget to offer me sherry. I explain: the discussion of economic
rights and civil liberties usually starts from a point that assumes that
equal protection guarantees equality of opportunity "blindly" for
the benefit of those market actors who have exercised rational
choices in wealth-maximizing kinds of ways. The corollary to this is
that those who make irrational non-profit-motivated choices have
chosen to be poor. I, however, take as given two counter-facts: (1)
that in this country we do subsidize the wealthy in all kinds of ways,
and we do so in a way that directly injures the poor; and (2) that the
states of neither indigency nor wealth are necessarily nor even frequently the result of freely exercised choice. I think that this wide
divergence of professed ideals and day-to-day reality has created in
us some costly degree of social schizophrenia; I think that over time,
our relation to both the marketplace and our sense of liberty-our
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view of ourselves as both free and free agents-has become tremendously complicated.
The dean offers me biscuits and a soft white cheese. This past
summer, I tell him, I drove across the country with a friend who had
never visited the United States before. His conclusion was that
"Free" is a magic word in America. Give me an example of what
you see, I urged. At that moment, we were on the highway just
outside Las Vegas. He merely pointed to a sign on a roadside
diner-it said: "Free! All you can eat, only $7.99."
Yet this sign was more than a joke. It symbolized the degree to
which much of what we call "freedom" is either oxymoronic or
meaningless. For example, when the United States Supreme Court,
in Buckley v. Valeo, held not just that it is undesirable to constrain
the expenditure of money in political elections, but that such an expenditure is speech'-what does this really mean? The Buckley Court
seems to have gone one step beyond merely holding that money is
related to access to expensive media. Rather, the Court seems to
imply that if one could speak freely (without pecuniary cost, that is)
but could not spend money, then one still would be "censored."
But if expression is commodified in this fashion, then can it not be
bought and sold? Is money itself communicative, and of what? Is
the introduction of money as a concept of expression a little like
introducing usury into our love lives? Can speech be usurious? Is
money a form of language, in the way we think of speech as language? What does this imply for oaths, rituals, and the swearing of
attachments? Can we now say "political money" and "artistic
money" and mean the same thing as when we say "political speech"
and "artistic expression"? What does free speech or freedom itself
mean, if it really has a price?
7. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
8. Id. at 39. The Supreme Court stated:
While the independent expenditure ceiling thus fails to serve any substantial
governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in
the electoral process, it heavily burdens core First Amendment expression ....
Advocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no less
entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation.
It is argued, however, that the ancillary governmental interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of
elections serves to justify the limitation on express advocacy of the election or
defeat of candidates imposed by § 608(e)(1)'s expenditure ceiling. But the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements in our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment ....

Id. at 47-49 (footnote omitted).
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Here is what troubles me: we use money to express our valuation of things. We express equivalencies through money, and in
that process of laying claim through the application of
equivalencies, we not only make egalitarian, we introduce a powerful levelling device.
Through reducing to commodified
equivalencies, we can bargain away what is undesirable; we can
purchase and create a market for what is desirable. But given the
way we use money, we also dispense with the necessity of valuing or
considering (for is that not the definition of "consideration" 9 in our
economically-derived conception of contract?) that which is outside
the market.
The sherry is beginning to go to my head. If, I demand somewhat sharply of the dean, political discourse is a market phenomenon, what happens to those members, that part, of the polis that is
outside the market-that cannot or will not be bought and sold?
And what, indeed, is the impact of buying and selling on the polis
that is within the market place of ideas?
I think, I say jabbing the air with my finger, that the answer to
all of this is increasingly, if not immediately, apparent in the construction of American political discourse, not just in things like
political action committees (PACs) lobbying for legislation, but in
the pernicious degree to which advertising agencies and wheel-offortune style popularity polls determine the course of world
events-elections, health care, invasions, and whole wars. The focus of politics is shifted, in other words, from concepts such as service to duty, to purchasers and the buying public. It is
representative politics alright, but wealth-representative politics that
is the exact equivalent of what Robert Ellickson so appallingly endorsed in his article, Cities and Homeowners Associations.'0 The focus of
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(a) (1981) provides that "[t]o constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained for." Section
79 further provides that: "[i]f the requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of (a) a gain, advantage, or benefit to the promisor or a loss, disadvantage, or detriment to the promisee; or (b) equivalence in the values exchanged; or (c)
'mutuality of obligation.' " Id. § 79.
10. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982). In
encouraging consideration of a system of local elections in which voting power would be
based on "economic stake" in a community, Ellickson writes:
[S]uppose that voting power in a suburb were to be reallocated from one-voteper-resident to one-vote-per-acre. That reallocation would strengthen
prodevelopment forces relative to antidevelopment forces because owners of
undeveloped land would gain in political power. Assume more housing would
be built. If exclusionary practices had previously pushed housing prices above
competitive levels, housing prices would fall. It is possible that the gains lowincome families would obtain from the drop in housing prices would outweigh
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politics is shifted from amassing the greatest amount of intellectual,
social, or erotic capital to the simple amassing of capital.
It enables the wealthiest presidential candidates to purchase the
soft fuzzy image of"I am a real American," and to hoard it like commodity wealth. It allows the spurning of those who do not express
themselves through expenditure as "undeserving." It allows
speechwriters to become the property of presidents. And the harm
I see from this is that it puts reality up for sale, makes meaning fungible, and makes meaning dishonest, empty, irresponsible.
An image that comes to mind is that of Jessica Lange testifying
to Congress about the condition of farms in America because she
had played a farmer's wife." What on earth does "testimony" mean
in that context? Similarly, the movie Mississippi Burning, 2 by making
history subservient to the selling of a product, purchased a new rendering of reality, of history, of experience; it provided a profound
illustration of this commodity-quantification, as mercenarily-motivated political re-presentation. Public discourse becomes privatized,
speech becomes moneyed, and money becomes the measure of our
lives.
I pause for breath. The dean says quietly, "But money is real,"
and refills my glass.
I fail to heed the warning in his voice and continue rashly: Jean
Baudrillard has said that "[t]he secret of gambling is that money
does not exist as a value."' 3 It seems to me that the secret of the
Madison Avenue stakes for which our legal and political futures are
played is that words do not exist as a value in the constitution of
political currency.
In our legal and political system, words like "freedom" and
"choice" are forms of currency. They function as the mediators by
which we make all things equal, interchangeable, fungible. It is,
therefore, not just what "freedom" means; it is the relation it signals
between each individual and the world. It is a word that levels
difference.
Similarly, money itself signals a certain type of relationship. So
other losses they would sustain from residing in a suburb that conferred voting
power according to a formula that was facially disadvantageous to them. In
other words, an apparently regressive voting system may have progressive distributional consequences.
Id. at 1562 (footnote omitted).
11. See 131 CONG. REc. S5727 (daily ed. May 9, 1985) (statement ofJessica Lange).
12. Orion Pictures 1988.
13. J. BAUDRILLARD, Forget Baudrillard, in FORGET FOUCAULT 86 (1987).
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perhaps it is not just money that is the problem, but the relationship
it signals-the tit for tat; the purchasing of our liberties; the peonage of our citizenship. As one analyst has described it:
In bourgeois ideology, history is negated by the process of
exchange; in the equalization brought about by the need to
determine that one ware is worth another ware, and everything has its price, that this equals that, history is replaced
by an eternal stasis where values remain constant in an ideological tit for tat where the equal sign ensures a neverending binary equilibrium in which a change on one side of
the equation is always balanced by the algebraically obligatory change on the other. Everything becomes a perfect
metaphor for everything else, for in the end all equations
say the same thing and all equations say nothing. The
emptiness behind the binary opposition is the emptiness
behind the equation 0=0. One thing is opposed to another thing in a two-fold opposition incapable of accommodating marginalities, third forces, or synthesis. 14
The next day, I receive a note from the dean. It says that he has
received a variety of complaints about the "polemical" nature of my
teaching and that he indeed feels that my "style" is inappropriate in
"the" law school classroom. That night, I go home, pour my own
sherry, and write up my lecture notes for the next day's class, which
on the next day, I go in and give, out of neither defiance nor defeat,
but because I do not have anything else to say:
In Brazil, women are being asked to provide proof of sterilization before they will be hired. This comes in the wake of new legis5
lation granting pregnant women four months of maternity leave.'
This law mostly affects poor women, rather than middle-class women who
are able to return to work almost as quickly as they want
because they can draw on a vast pool of poorly paid domestic servants, few of whom have social benefits. . . . Such
servants ... also earned the right to maternity leave under
the new laws. The Association for Domestic Workers in
Rio De Janeiro believes this city alone has at least 300,000
nannies and maids and the group16has said it will now watch
out for these women's interests.
14. Brockman, Bitburg Deconstruction, 7 PHIL. F. 160 (1986).
15. Simons, Brazil 4'omen Find Fertility May CostJobs, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1988, at A 1,
col. 1.
16. Id.
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In the United States, however, we disguise the brutal directness of
such bargains. In the private sector, we have employers who, based
on arguments of fetal rights and protection, refuse to hire any woman "capable" of bearing a child. 7
And more troubling still, in the public sector, we have the increasing phenomenon of sentencing hearings in which defendants
in certain types of cases like child abuse or rape are offered a
"choice" between time in jail and sterilization. 8 The defendant, in
privatized terms, is positioned as a purchaser, as "buying" her freedom by paying the price of her womb. And because that womb is in
the position of money in this equivalency, it seems to many to be a
form of expression, a voluntary and willing expenditure in the commerce of free choice.
One of the more peculiar examples of this is the case of Roscoe
Brown, a black South Carolinian convicted of rape.' 9 In an arrangement styled to resemble a contract, Brown was offered a commutation of his thirty-year prison sentence if he would agree to be
castrated. 2" After spending some time in prison, Brown asked to be
castrated. Civil libertarians intervened and the case was appealed to
the Supreme Court of South Carolina. Fortunately, that court ruled
that the castration "option" would amount to cruel and unusual
punishment. 2 ' The question that this case raised for me was the
interpretation of the words "contract," "freedom of choice," and
"autonomy." "In 1985," wrote the New York Times, "three convicted rapists in South Carolina were resentenced after the state
Supreme Court said a judge's decision to let them choose castration
over prison violated their rights to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment." ' 22 The vocabulary of allowance and option seems
meaningless in this context of an imprisoned defendant dealing with
a judge whose power is, in effect, absolute as to his fate. Yet inJanuary 1989, I saw Roscoe Brown's white lawyer on television vehemently arguing that Brown should be allowed to be castrated, that
17. See U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 898-99 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
granted, 110 S.Ct. 1521 (1990).
18. See, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Ariz. 67, 725 P.2d 1101 (1986); Nebraska
v. Cavitt (In re Cavitt), 182 Neb. 712, 157 N.W.2d 171 (1968), prob. juris noted, 393 U.S.

1078 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 996 (1970).
19. State v. Brown, 284 S.C. 407, 326 S.E.2d 410 (1985).
20. Castration is not merely male sterilization as in a vasectomy. Castration is the
actual removal of the iestes, and was outlawed in many colonies even as against slaves.
See generally W. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BICK 154-63 (1968).
21. Brown, 284 S.C. at 411, 326 S.E.2d at 412.
22. Plan to Sterilize Women is Debated, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1988, § 1, at 35, col. 1
(emphasis added).
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the refusal to allow the arrangement to go forward was unwarranted
state intrusion into his privacy.
I have some difficulty in getting my students to understand why
this might not be good private contract. I find myself besieged with
questions, faces full of sincerity, mouths round with worried wonder. "Why do you want to rob the defendant of his last little bit of
freedom?" asks one. "But the defendant chose the castration," says
another.
I continue: It is true that the transaction was structured as a
contract. The power of that structure, however, transforms the discourse from one of public obligation and consensus into one of
privatized economy. This positioning renders invisible both the
force of the state and the enormous judicial whimsy exercised in the
selection of such a currency. It allows us to think that it is not the
state that is putting the cut on its citizenry; it allows us to sustain the
fiction, the half-truth, that the cut is coming from the defendant's
own mouth. It is he who is begging to be castrated. It is, as Professor Sacvan Bercovitch has observed, Ahab's notion of covenant: "I
'2
do not order ye; ye will it. 3

"But what if the defendant really, really wanted it?" insists another student.
I respond by asking: What does the defendant's "really, really"
wanting it mean in such a context? After all, the scenario of someone begging, "really, really" imploring to be castrated, is very close
to what, in another realm of sexual affairs, is called "dominance and
submission." But is what the defendant wants the issue anyway?
And what else is at stake in a case that bears the name "People [i.e.,
the public] v. Roscoe Brown?"
I do not think it serves any social interest to window-dress the
enormous power and dominance of the state over sentencing proceedings by transforming the public interest in consistent and fair
sentencing into one of private desire. The "private desire" which
comes out of the defendant's mouth is, in fact, the private whimsy of
the judge. The inversion of having the defendant beg to be dominated does not make the state any less dominating; nor does the
inversion serve to make the state "submissive." The force of the
state remains; the backdrop of incarceration generally is understood
as signifying something significantly different from an invisible hand
or economic incentive. Yet, what does seem to be obscured is that
23. Bercovitch, Hawthorne's A-Morality of Compromise, 24
(1988).

REPRESENTATIONS

1, 11
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the state is creating a situation in which it exercises power over who
shall have children or not, and that judges are exercising unprecedented latitude to impose sentences that have no statutory or precedential authority. And the problem with this is not simply that it
"breaks the rules," but that it displaces any public discourse about
what sort of force the state should use. But it is all of us who are on
trial in criminal sentencing proceedings: do we really, really want
the state requiring a ransom of body parts?
This notion of privately purchased public rights is manifested at
a more complicated level in the recent Supreme Court decision to
permit a state to choose whether or not it will protect its children
from abuse. 24 (At the same time, this is a Court that has not hesitated to assert itself in the "protection" of minors, to say nothing of
adults, from information about birth control and abortion.) All this
is a notion of governmental responsibility that is less rooted in the
jurisprudence of enduring social compact than that of short-term
private contract. This privatized view would impose no duty at all
unless the state, like some arm's length private transactor, has undertaken the obligation, has assumed the debt. The logical corollary of this is that if the state has not been paid, if there has been no
consideration to support the state's activity toward its citizens, then
there is no obligation.
What does the state have to be paid for it to intervene to protect a citizen from abuse? I do not think it is as simple as taxes.
What is it a child would have to introduce as currency by which care
of the state would be made a right? Does this not begin to resemble
the argument advanced by Professor Carl Wellman in his article The
Growth of Children's Rights, in which he maintains that children have
25
no rights until they are grown enough to make a claim to them?
Does this not really mean that children do not have the Price? Children and the poor make no considered bargains and therefore they
do not exist until they can buy and sell the property of themselves.
Before their emergence as property manipulators, there is no inducement, no exchange-no tat, no tit. The child's interests and the
indigent's welfare become an incidental commodity to be purchased
or not, a governmental obligation only if the right price is paid and

24. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998, 1007
(1989); see also Comment, DeShaney v. Winnebago County: The Narrowing Scope of Constitutional Torts, 49 MD. L. REV. 484 (1990).
25. Wellman, The Growth of Children's Rights, 70 ARCHIv FUR RECHTS-UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 441, 451-52 (1984).
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the right laissez-faire subcontractors can be found to produce or
provide the thing desired.
It is as though we lived in some supermarket state, a rich array
of options lining the shelves, the choices contingent only upon the
size of our budget. By this analogy, governmental goods and services all become fungible, equivalent. If there is no independent
duty to provide welfare for citizens, if there is no community inspiration to provide it as a right, or gift, as some have characterized it,
then the legislature becomes not the servant of the long-term public
interest, but a slave to the buying public. Governmental actions become guided not by necessity but by trend. A municipal golf course,
by such momentary consumerist vision, is as good a choice-and
certainly easier-than child welfare.
These bargained freedoms perhaps are nowhere better exemplified than in the words of President Bush's failed nominee for Secretary of Defense, John Tower. He promised, if you recall, to give
up drinking if he got the job.2 6 Not that he would give up drinking
period, or that he would give up drinking because it wrecked his
homelife, or because of public pressure, but that he would give it up
if. Tit for tat. His sobriety was positioned as a commodity that we
the public, through Congress, could purchase for the low, low price
of our national defense. Like a used car salesman who will throw in
air conditioning if you write the check now. He dangled his sobriety
like a hostage or a bribe, if we had any sense of communal public
relation left; but only like a gleaming display-encased option if we
come at it from the atherosclerotic muddiness of the over-expended
mental state we call "privacy."
This mental state is destructive, not just as a concern about constitutional protections or civil liberties, but also in the marketplace.
It shifts emphasis from commerce among people for real things, and
becomes instead a system which transforms, in Francis Bacon's imagery, the idol of the marketplace into the idol of the theater.
When I first started teaching consumer protection a decade
ago, the mathematics of false advertising were simple. If the box or
the brochure said, for example, "100% cotton," you merely took
the item in question and subtracted it from the words: any difference was the measure of your legal remedy. Sometimes you had to
add in buyer's expertise, or multiply the whole by seller's bad faith,

26. See Rosenthal, Tower Takes Vow He Will Not Drink If He Is Confirmed, N.Y. Times,

Feb. 27, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
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but all in all, the whole reason people even took a class in consumer
protection was that you did not have to learn logarithms.
Today, however, advertisers rarely represent anything remotely
related to the reality of the product (or the politician) they are trying
to sell; misrepresentation, the heart of false advertising statutes, is
almost impossible to prove. Increasingly, television ads are characterized by scripts, if they have scripts, that never mention the product nor contain a description of any sort.2 7 Instead, what fills the
sixty seconds are "concepts" and diffuse images-images that used
to be discursive, floating in the background, creating a mellow-consumerist backdrop-images which now dominate and direct, fill in
entirely for content. Nothing is promised, everything "evoked."
Warm fuzzy camera angles. "Peak" experiences. Happy pictures,
mood-shaping music. Almost always a smarmy, soft-peddling
overvoice purring something like: "This magic moment has been
brought to you by. .. ."
About a year ago, I was sitting at home, installed before the
television set. I was preparing for a class in consumer protection.
The next day's assignment was false advertising and I was shopping
for an advertisement, any advertisement, whose structure I could
use as a starting point for class discussion.
An ad for Georges Marciano clothing flashed on the screen and
dragged me in, first with the music, Southern African music of
haunting urgency, the echoing simultaneity of nonlinear music, the
syncopation of quickening-heartbeat percussive music, dragging the
ear. In the picture, a long-blond-haired woman in sunglasses ran
from a crowd of photographers and an admiring public. The film
was black and white, a series of frames cut short and jaggedly succeeding each other, like a patchwork of secretly-taken stills. Sliced
into the sequence of her running away were shots of her and her
manager/bodyguard/boyfriend packing. He packed the passports
and the handgun. She packed the Georges Marciano jeans. The climax came when she burst into a room of exploding flashbulbs-a
blazing bath of white light, an emphatic shift in tone.
The effect of this particular visual and aural juxtaposition was
the appearance of the music being inside the blond woman's head,
or her heart. The music was primal, dangerous, desperate. The woman's crisis of adoration framed the burning necessity of this
profound music and the soaring universality of sound became white,
27. The advertisements for the luxury automobile line "Infiniti," which show waves
washing over a rocky shore but rarely, if ever, show the automobile, is a recent example.
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female, privatized. The pulsing political movement of the music elevated this event of narcissistic voyeurism to primal importance.
The music overflowed boundaries. Voices merged and surged;
mood drifted and soared listening to it. African voices swelled and
rose in the intricate music of knowledge, the wisdom of rhythm, the
physics of echoing chasms bounded in intervals, the harmonic bells
of voices striking each other in excitement and the wind, Black African voices making music of the trees, of the groundhogs, of the
whistling birds, and the pure chortling streams. It was generous,
shared music, open and eternal.
The pictures presented sought privacy. The chase was an invasion; the photographers pursued her private moments; she resisted
even as her glamour consented. The viewer was drawn by the desire
to see her never-quite-revealed face, swept along by the urgency of
her running to privacy, even as we never quite acknowledged her
right to it. Thus, the moment of climax, the flashing of cameras in
her face (and ours-we do not actually see her face even then-so
completely have we identified with her) was one of release and
relief.
The music acted in contradistinction to the pictures. The mind
resolved it queerly. The positive magnetic boundlessness of the
music was turned into negative exposure. The run for privacy became an orgasmic peep show, the moment of negative exposure almost joyful.
In my lap, the heaviness of my textbook lay loose, unattended
pages drifting open to the Lanham Act:
False designations of origin and false descriptions
forbidden
(a) Civil action
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods
or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce
any word, term, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which- . . . shall be liable in a civil
action by any person who believes that he or she is likely to
28
be damaged by such act.
I have recounted this story at some length, and just as I entered
it into my journal at the time it occurred, not just for its illustrative
contrast between the sight and the sound of this advertisement, but
28. Lanham Act, § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
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also because I think that the relationship between the music and the
pictures acts as a metaphor for the tension between the political and
marketplace dynamic that is my larger subject. I think that the invisible corruption of one by the other has consequences of which our
unawareness is, ultimately, dehumanizing.
Ours is not the first generation to fall prey to false needs. It,
however, is the first generation of admakers to realize the complete
fulfillment of the consumerist vision through the fine-tuning of
sheer hucksterism. Surfaces, fantasies, appearances, and vague associations are the order of the day. So completely have inherencies,
substance, reality, and utility been subverted that products have
been purified into mere wisps of labels, floating signifiers of their
former selves. "Coke" can as. easily add life plastered on clothing as
poured in a cup.
Calculating a remedy for this new-age consumptive pandering
is quite problematic. If people like-and buy-the enigmatic emptiness used to push products, then describing a harm becomes quite
elusive. But it is elusive precisely because the imagery and vocabulary of advertising has shifted from need to disguise. With this shift
has come-either manipulated or galloping gladly behind-a shift in
the public appetite for illusion and disguise. And in the wake of that,
has come an enormous shift of national industry, national resources,
and national consciousness.
Some years ago, when I first started teaching, most of my students agreed with me that a nice L.L. Bean Baxter State Parka delivered without a little label saying "L.L. Bean" was a minor defect
indeed. Today, I have to work to convince them that the absence of
that label alone is not a major breach of contract; I have to make
them think about what it is that makes the parka an L.L. Bean: its
utility or its image? Its service to the wearer or its impact on those
around the wearer? If masque becomes the whole basis of our bargains, I worry that we will forget the jazzy, primal King Lear-ish
center of ourselves from which wisdom springs and insight grows. I
worry that we will create new standards of irrelevancy in our lives,
reprioritizing social relations in favor of the luxurious. And since
few of us can afford real luxury, blind greed becomes their necessary
companion.
On a yet more complicated level, I worry that in accustoming
ourselves to the overwhelming emptiness of media fictions, we will
have reconstructed our very notion of property. If property is literally the word or the concept used to describe it, then we have empowered the self-willed speaker not just as market actor, but as
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ultimate Creator. If property is nothing more than what it evokes
on the most intimate, and subjective levels, then the inherency of its
object is denied; the separateness of the thing which is property
must be actively obliterated to maintain the privately sensational
pleasantry of the propagated mirror-image. An habituated, acculturated blindness to the people and things around us, grows up
based on our privilege, and on our safety from having to see. Our
interrelationship with these things is not seen; their reasons for being are rendered invisible.
At the simplest level of market economics, the modern algebra
of advertising deprives society of a concept of commodities as enduring. Sales of goods are no longer the subject of express or longterm promissory relationships-there is at best an implied warranty
of merchantability at the fleeting moment of contract and delivery.
Contract law's historic expectation interest 29 becomes even more
thoroughly touch and go, in the most virulent tradition of caveat
emptor. It is an unconscious narrowing of expectation to the extent
that we lose our expectations. Thus, in some way, Coke and Pepsi
lead us to obliterate the future, not just with empty calories, but
with empty promises as well. The illusion of a perky, sexy self is
meaningless as to the reality of a can of corn syrup; but this substitution, this exchange of images is a harm going beyond wasted
money, tooth decay, or defeated notions of utility. The greater
harm is that it is hypnotic, and that it is culturally addictive.
In theory, contract doctrine is that currency of law used to impose economic order on human beings for certain purposes. Defenses to contract formation such as misrepresentation, duress, and
undue influence are, I think, a theoretical attempt to impose an ordered humanity on economics. Increasingly, however, the day-today consumer purchases that are the mass of what is governed by
contract have been characterized by a shift in popular as well as
legal discourse. Contract is no longer a three-party transliterative
code, in which law mediates between profit and relationship, and in
which property therefore remains linked to notions of a temporallysustained and shared humanity. Instead, consumerism is locked into
a two-party, bipolar code that is little more mediative than a mirror.
It becomes reified in an equation in which money reflects law and
law reflects money, unattached to notions of humanity. The neat
29. The "expectation interest" in contract is the promisee's "interest in having the
benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had
the contract been performed ....... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a)
(1981).
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jurisprudence of interpretive transposition renders the whole into a
system of equivalencies in which money=money, words=words (or
law=law). The worst sort of mindless materialism arises. The worst
sort of punitive literalism puts down roots.
Some time ago, my friend and colleague, Professor Dinesh
Khosla traveled to Costa Rica for a conference. On his way back to
the United States, he found himself in the airport behind throngs of
Costa Ricans pushing five or six huge suitcases apiece. Dinesh
stopped several times to assist several different people. In every
case, he was surprised by how light and empty the suitcases felt.
When he had gotten this far in the story, I already had imagined its
end; I had filled the suitcases with media stereotypes of feathery
coca leaves and dusty white powders. But I was wrong. It turned
out that Dinesh's fellow travelers were all wealthy Costa Ricans traveling to Miami for the sole purpose of shopping. They planned to
load up the suitcases with designer clothes and fancy consumables
and cart them back home. I was reminded of the Sufi tale of the
customs official who for years scrutinized the comings and goings of
a man famed as a smuggler. For years he subjected each of his parcels to thorough searches but all he ever found was straw. Many
years later when they were both retired, he asked the smuggler just
where he had hidden the contraband all those years. The smuggler
replied: "I was smuggling straw." Dinesh's account recast the conspicuous luxury of North American commodities as a similar form of
invisible contraband, as a sinfully expensive and indulgent drug.
One final anecdote: only a little way down Broadway from the
14th Street subway station, in Manhattan, there is a store called the
Unique Boutique. Yards from the campus of New York University
(NYU), it is the place where stylish co-eds shop for the slightly
frumpy, slightly punky, slightly slummy clothes that go so well with
bright red lipstick and ankle-high black bootlets. One winter day, I
emerged from the subway and passed by the store. There I saw a
large, bright, fun-colored sign hanging in the window that said:
"Sale! Two dollar overcoats. No bums, no booze." Offended, and
not wanting to feel how offended I was, I turned my head away and
looked out onto the street. There, in the middle of the intersection
of Broadway and Washington Place, stood a black man dressed in
the ancient remains of a Harris Tweed overcoat. His arms were
spread-eagled as if in flight, though he actually was begging from
cars in both directions. He also was drunk and crying and trying to
keep his balance. Drivers were offended, terrified of disease, and of
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being robbed. Traffic slowed as cars made wide avoidant arcs
around him and his broad-winged pleading.
My alarmed thoughts about this: the sign in the window disenfranched the very people who most need two dollar overcoats, the
so-called bums. Moreover, it was selling the image of the disenfranchised themselves. This store is a trendy boutique aimed at
NYU's undergraduate population. It was selling an image of genteel poverty, of casual dispossession. It attracts those who can afford to "slum" in style, yet it simultaneously restricts and exploits
the slum itself. It was segregationist in the same way that "whites
only" signs are. And it was not just segregationist along class lines,
but segregated among those who appeared to fall within one category
or another. It took the images of those who had nothing and
"styled" it as a commodity (slumminess) to be sold to those who
have so much. It was the ultimate in short-term consumerist redundancy: clothes do not just make the man, they would admit him into
the clothing store itself.
In discussing the tension between liberty and authority, John
Stuart Mill observed that self-government means "not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest."3 Mill feared
what he called the "tyranny of the majority" and cautioned that:
[p]rotection ...against the tyranny of the magistrate is not

enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of
the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of
society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its
own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who
dissent from them .... [H]ow to make the fitting adjust-

ment between individual independence and social control-is a subject on which nearly everything remains to be
done. 3 '
The tyranny of the majority that Mill so feared has survived in
liberal political theory as a justification for legislative restraint, particularly economic restraint. But what Mill did not anticipate was
that the power of suasion over the forum itself might be so great
that it would subvert the polis, as well as the law, to the extent that
there is today precious little "public" left, just the tyranny of what
we call the private. It is true, there is relatively little force in the
public domain compared to other nations, relatively little intrusive
30. J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 72 (H.B. Acton ed. 1984).
31. Id. at 73.
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governmental interference. But we risk instead the life-crushing
disenfranchisement of an entirely owned world. Permission must be
sought to walk upon the face of the earth. Freedom becomes. contractual and therefore obligated; freedom is framed by obligation;
and obligation is paired not with duty but with debt.

